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Abstract
The catastrophic Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 raised a number of
questions for scientists and politicians on how to deal with the tsunami risk in coastal
regions. This paper discusses the challenges in tsunami risk evaluation and presents
the results of a tsunami risk mitigation study for the west coast of Thailand. It is
argued that a scenario-based approach is particularly well suited for evaluation of the
risk posed by tsunamis. The approach consists of considering scenarios of plausible
extreme, tsunami-generating events, computing the tsunami inundation levels caused
by these events, estimating the possible range of casualties for the computed inundation levels, and estimating the upper and lower bounds on the annual probability of
occurrence of the scenarios.
Other challenges related to perceived risk vs. real risk, acceptable/tolerable
risk levels, and the use of the results in the decision making process are also put into
perspectives.
Introduction
The Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 was triggered by a gigantic magnitude 9.3 earthquake on the Sunda Arc subduction zone. The tsunami caused over
250,000 casualties, and devastated large areas along the coastlines of Indonesia,
Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, India, the Maldives and even some parts of
the east African coast. Along the west coast of Thailand, the tsunami caused about
8,000 fatalities due to inundation levels of 5 to 12 m above the sea level at the most
severely affected areas.
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In the aftermath of this catastrophic event, the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI) did a fast-track study (NGI, 2006) for the Department of Mineral
Resources (DMR) and the Coordinating Committee for Geoscience Programs in East
and Southeast Asia (CCOP). The aim of the study was to assess the future tsunami
risk in Thailand, and to help develop a reconstruction and rehabilitation strategy for
the tsunami-affected areas of the country. The assessment and quantification of
future tsunami risk presented a number of challenges. This caused some difficulties
in applying the same methods as commonly used for other natural dangers. The risk
assessment approach adopted for the project and the obtained results are presented in
the paper.
The risk assessment terminology used in this paper is consistent with the
“Glossary of Terms for Risk Assessment” developed by Technical Committee on
Risk Assessment and Management (TC32) of the International Society of Soil
Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering (ISSMGE) (www.engmath.dal.ca/tc32).
Definitions of some of the important terms used in the paper are provided in the
following.
Danger (Threat): The natural phenomenon that could lead to damage, described in
terms of its geometry, magnitude, mechanical and other characteristics. The danger
can be an existing one (such as a creeping slope) or a potential one (such as a
tsunami). The characterization of a danger or threat does not include any spatiotemporal probability or forecasting.
Hazard: Probability that a particular danger (threat) occurs within a given period of
time.
Consequence: In relation to risk analysis, the outcome or result of a hazard being
realized.
Risk: Measure of the probability and severity of an adverse effect to life, health,
property, and/or the environment. Quantitatively, Risk = f (Hazard, Potential Worth
of Loss). This is commonly expressed as “Probability of an adverse event times the
consequences of that event”.
Risk mitigation: A selective application of appropriate techniques and management
principles to reduce or even avoid either likelihood of an occurrence or its adverse
consequences, or both.
Acceptable risk: A risk which everyone impacted is prepared to accept. Action to
further reduce such risk is usually not required unless reasonably practicable measures are available at low cost in terms of money, time and effort.
Tolerable risk: A risk within a range that society can live with so as to secure certain
net benefits. It is a range of risks regarded as non-negligible and needing to be kept
under review and reduced further if possible.
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ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) principle: The principle which states
that risks, lower than the limit of tolerability, are tolerable only if risk reduction is
impracticable or if its cost is grossly in disproportion (depending on the level of risk)
to the improvement gained.
Challenges in tsunami-risk assessment
In modern engineering practice, buildings, infrastructure and lifelines are designed to
withstand environmental load effects, such as earthquake acceleration, flood level,
ground movements or wind velocity, which are caused by an event with a given
annual probability of exceedance – and preferably defined spatial extent. For example, Eurocode-8 recommends a return period of 475 years (10% probability of
exceedance in 50 years) at a given location for the design of normal residential
buildings against earthquake loads, and somewhat higher return periods for schools,
hospitals, fire stations and buildings where many people might be gathered and
potentially affected (CEN, 2002). The framework behind this methodology is a reliability-based design approach which assumes that the annual extremes of the load
effect in question have a well-behaved, continuous distribution. The code-specified
design return period and associated partial safety factors indirectly imply a target
(acceptable) failure probability for the structure, or the set of structures in question.
The tsunami load effects do not lend themselves easily to this simplification.
The physical process characteristics of the potential triggers of a tsunami are such
that there exists a lower threshold return period, below which the expected tsunami
wave height is insignificant in terms of likely consequences, and above which it
increases rapidly up to an upper threshold level. If this upper threshold is exceeded,
total loss is unavoidable. Such thresholds have already been discussed for other natural processes, such as landslides and debris flows (e.g. Wieczorek & Glade 2005).
These threshold characteristics make the tsunami an 'ill-behaving' load in a
probabilistic framework, i.e. tsunami wave height vs. return period (on a log-scale) is
expected to be highly non-linear. Other challenges related to tsunami risk assessment
are dealing with low hazard events that have extreme severe consequences, whether
an effective tsunami warning system will be in operation, uncertainties in estimation
of tsunami load effects due to scarcity of data, communication of the warnings to the
potentially endangered society, issues related to risk perception by different groups
of potentially affected society, and, in terms of preventive measures, on acceptable
societal risk criteria. Four issues are especially important to keep in mind while
addressing these challenges:
1. Risk mitigation measures should be for potential future tsunamis, not for the
tsunami that happened on 26 December 2004.
2. Tsunamis with similar or even larger magnitudes have occurred in these areas
long before humans settled. Thus tsunamis are part of the general “set” of
natural processes operating in these regions and consequently, it is just a
matter of time until the next tsunami of even greater magnitude will occur.
3. It is vital to have a long-term view of the problem. The actions taken today
will affect the exposure of future generations to tsunami risk.
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4. If the present trends in population growth and development along the coastlines continue, the exposure of the societies along the coastlines to tsunami
risk will increase.
Characteristics of tsunami from an engineering design perspective
Most common environmental loads and load effects, such as the stresses induced in a
structure by earthquake, wind, and snow, or the highest water level in a river during a
flood event, can be classified as ‘well-behaving’ loads in a probabilistic sense
(Figure 1). These loads exhibit a more or less linear characteristic on a plot showing
the load-level vs. the logarithm of return period.
The well-behaving loads fit nicely into the partial safety factor format of
modern design codes. The code defines the return period of the design event and the
partial safety factors that are used to obtain a target reliability level (i.e. an acceptable annual failure probability).
Unfortunately, the tsunami wave height falls into the category of ‘ill-behaving’ loads from an engineering design perspective as it exhibits a highly non-linear
behavior in the type of plot shown on Figure 1. Such characteristics are known from
other natural process and are currently investigated in terms of non-linearity, complexity, chaos, and emergence (e.g. Harrison, 2001; Phillips, 2003). Due to the characteristics of the physical processes governing the tsunami, there exists a threshold
return period below which the expected tsunami wave height is insignificant (earthquakes with magnitude less than 7.5 rarely trigger a tsunami), and above which it
increases rapidly.

Figure 1. Theoretical examples of “well-behaving” and “ill-behaving” loads with
respect to engineering practice (Haver, 2005).
There are other types of geohazards, for example debris flow, for which the
magnitude or intensity of the triggering mechanism should be above a threshold
value before the process is initiated. All the ‘threshold-dependent’ processes would
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fall into the ‘ill-behaving’ load category from an engineering design perspective, and
they do not fit well into the design formats developed for well-behaving loads.
On the other hand, there are several aspects of the tsunami load which are
well defined. The direction of the loading is given, and the area affected by the load
is, in most situations, limited to a few hundred meters from the shoreline. This makes
the tsunami problem ideal for scenario (what-if) studies. By considering a few
plausible scenarios of extreme events, the geographical extent of the potentially
affected areas can be identified, risk reduction measures can be suggested and locally
adopted, and accepted strategies can be implemented. The physical consequences of
the scenario tsunami events (i.e. maximum water level, water flow velocity and
inundation distance from the shoreline), combined with the physical and social
constraints as well as coping possibilities in the areas of interest, form the basis for
risk mitigation measures as part of long-term risk management strategies. The
knowledge of the potential consequence of a future tsunami event might support
decision-makers at regional (municipality), national (government) or global levels
(United Nations organizations) of governmental as well as non-governmental
organizations (e.g. Red Cross, Terre des hommes) in their decisions for preventive
actions (e.g. education, land-use planning) as well as for immediate responses to a
forthcoming event.
Risk and its perception
The most complete description of the possible losses (risk) is quantitatively in terms
of a “probability distribution”, which presents the relative likelihood of any particular loss value or the probability of losses being less than any particular value. Alternatively, the “expected value” (i.e., the probability weighted average value) of loss
can be determined as a single measure of risk. A general scenario-based risk formulation is given by:
E[ Loss ] =

∑ ∑ C ⋅ P[C | S ] ⋅ P[S ]

All S

All C

where C is particular set of losses (of comprehensive and mutually exclusive set of
possible losses), S is particular scenario (of comprehensive and mutually exclusive
discrete set of possible scenarios), P[S] is probability of occurrence of scenario S,
P[C | S] is the conditional probability of loss set C given that scenario S has
occurred, and E[Loss] is the “expected value” of loss. “Loss” may refer to any
undesirable consequence, such as loss of human life, economic loss, loss of reputation, etc., in terms of its direct and indirect effects (e.g. local damage of railway
tracks and related interruption of industrial traffic), its affects on different social
groups (e.g. individuals, community, insurance, government) as well as its short- and
long-term influences on a society (e.g. fatalities could include all children of a community, the tourist industry might collapse). The focus of the present study was on
the loss of human life.
Calculation of the terms in the above equation is not trivial. As it will be
shown later, the hazard term in the above equation (i.e. P[S]) is not constant with
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time. Moreover, the expected number of fatalities depends on many factors, for
example on which week-day and what time of the day the tsunami occurs, whether
the tsunami occurs during high tide or low tide, whether or not an effective tsunami
warning system is operative at the time of the tsunami, how the issued warning is
communicated to the respective groups and individuals, public awareness on what to
do if tsunami warning is issued, etc. An implicit assumption in the study is that an
effective tsunami warning will be in place in Thailand and other countries around the
Indian Ocean within a few years. Although various organizations and institutions
work on the implementation of such an early warning system, this assumption may
prove to be problematic.
The potentially affected population could be divided into three groups based
on their temporal exposure to the tsunami danger, and their choice in exposing themselves to risk: 1) people who live in the exposed areas permanently, 2) tourists who
only live in the exposed areas one or two weeks each year, and 3) locals who do not
live in the exposed areas, but work there during the tourist season. The risk considerations for the 3 groups are not the same. What matters for the first group is the
“real risk” (which might be impossible to quantify) which is taken deliberately or
unconsciously, while the “perceived risk” influences heavily the behavior of the
second group, because their exposure to the “real risk” is much lower than the first
group due to their limited temporal exposure. The number of people comprising the
third group is strongly correlated to the number of tourists, so for this group both the
real risk and the perceived risk are important.
The real risk and the perceived risk for the tsunami are likely to be quite
different. The tsunami modeling studies done for the project showed that the most
likely source for a tsunami on the west coast of Thailand is a major shallow earthquake on the northern section of the Sumatra-Andaman subduction zone. Considering that this section of the fault experienced a magnitude 9.3 earthquake in December
2004 and a magnitude 8.7 earthquake in March 2005 (Nias earthquake), it is not
likely that a similar event would occur in the next few hundred years. One of the key
conclusions of the present study is that much of the energy stored on the fault is
already released and it will take several hundred years before the fault has the potential of being the source of a magnitude 9+ earthquake again. Consequently the scientifically derived annual probability of a major tsunami event in western Thailand
during the next fifty to hundred years is extremely low. However, the perceived risk
of a tsunami in that area is much higher because of the event that did happen
recently, and this is what really matters for various social groups, including the
decision-makers and the tourist industry in Thailand. In addition, social groups were
affected globally, as the fatalities included also Europeans, Americans, Japanese,
etc., and were not limited to local population only – which is the case in most other
extreme events such as earthquakes or floods. Consequently, there is a global
involvement of a locally occurring event.
A rare event with extreme consequence
As the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 tragically demonstrated, a rare,
extreme tsunami event might cause thousands of fatalities. When the probability of
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occurrence of an undesirable event (e.g. hazard) is extremely low and the consequences have the potential to be extremely high, the calculated risk in terms of
expected human fatalities is highly uncertain. The calculated risk is essentially a zero
times infinity problem. This implies that an outcome could change by several orders
of magnitude due to very small variations in the initial assumptions. To a lesser
degree, this issue is also a problem for estimating the risk posed by an extreme earthquake or landslide. An argument that is sometimes used to distinguish earthquakes or
large landslides, which are relatively rare events, from other, more frequent natural
hazards, such as storms, floods, etc., is that latter often have a stronger place in
societal memory. Tsunamis are further up on that same scale.
Calculation of tsunami hazard and risk in Thailand
In contrast to other process investigations, not enough data are currently available to
establish the magnitude-frequency statistics for tsunamis in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, to establish such relationships, other techniques, such as the Probabilistic
Tsunami Hazard Analysis (PTHA) approach (Thio et al., 2005), should be employed.
Although PTHA has the potential to provide a rational framework for tsunami-resistant design in the future, there are too many weak links in the model at present to
form the basis for making decisions, the most important of which is the link between
the earthquake magnitude and depth, and seabed dislocations. Developing a reliable
PTHA framework for the coastal areas of Thailand and other countries around the
Indian Ocean was considered beyond the scope of the project.
The approach that was adopted for the study was to consider several scenarios
of plausible extreme, tsunami-generating earthquakes (and/or tsunami-generating
submarine slides, e.g. Tappin et al., 2001), compute the tsunami wave heights
triggered by these events, and estimate the upper and lower bounds on the annual
probability of occurrence of the scenarios. It involved the following steps:
1. Define scenarios for tsunami-generating earthquakes.
2. Compute the tsunami inundation levels for the scenario earthquake events.
3. Estimate the tsunami risk for the different scenarios.
4. Compare the estimated risk with tolerable or acceptable risk levels.
As mentioned earlier, this scenario-based approach is particularly well suited for
tsunamis because of their physical characteristics. For example, the direction of the
tsunami wave and potentially affected areas are known beforehand, and reliable
software for calculation of the propagation of the tsunami waves resulting from sea
floor displacements due to a fault movement or a submarine slide is available.
The seismic hazard evaluation performed in the study concluded that within
the next 50 to 100 years, the largest credible earthquake to be prepared for is a magnitude 8.5 event (Harbitz et al., 2006). The event could cause a tsunami which at the
most gives an inundation level of 1.5 to 2.0 m above sea level. If the tsunami occurs
at high tide, the inundation level could be 2.5 to 3.0 m above the mean sea level
(Harbitz et al., 2006). After about 100 to 200 years, the potential for earthquakes
greater than M 8.5 will increase gradually, and so does the potential for generating
larger tsunamis than that for the M 8.5 earthquake scenario (NGI, 2006; Karlsrud et
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al., 2005). The return period for the tsunami-generating M 8.5 event was estimated to
be 200 to 800 years.
The estimate of the return period of a magnitude 9.3 earthquake, similar to the
one that caused the tsunami on 26 December 2004, vary between 400 years using the
subduction rate, and 1140 years using the seismicity statistics (Harbitz et al., 2006).
A key issue regarding the return period is the timing of major earthquake events
within the occurrence cycle. The evaluations suggested that an M 9+ earthquake in
the Sumatra subduction zone with potential tsunami effects on Thailand will most
likely not occur before at least 400 years after the 2004 megathrust earthquake. For
the M 8 to 8.5 earthquakes the cyclicity is less predictable (i.e. the occurrence is
more random within recurrence interval), but even for such events the probability of
occurrence will be quite low for a long time after 2004, increasing gradually with
time. In the long-term perspective (100 – 200 years), risk mitigation measures should
protect the exposed population from a tsunami similar to the one that occurred on 26
December 2004, i.e. 5 to 12 m above the mean sea level. It should be noted,
however, that the maximum tsunami wave heights along the west coast of Thailand
and their spatial variation for a future M 9.3 earthquake may be quite different from
those observed during the 26 December 2004 event. The possible range of characteristics of a future extreme tsunami event needs further investigation.
Is the tsunami risk in Thailand acceptable?
A part of risk assessment and risk management is to deal with risk acceptance criteria. In the context of the present study, one of the key questions was “Is tsunami risk
level in Thailand acceptable?” Here, it is important to recognize the difference
between acceptable and tolerable risks defined earlier. This differentiation is often
reflected through the use of the so-called ‘F-N curves’. The F-N curves relate the
annual probability of causing N or more fatalities (F) to the number of fatalities, N.
This is the complementary cumulative distribution function. The term "N" can be
replaced by any other quantitative measure of consequences, such as monetary
measures. Such curves may be used to express societal risk criteria and to describe
the safety levels of particular facilities.
It is also important to clarify who defines the levels of acceptance and tolerance: The potentially affected population? A government agency? The design engineer? This is crucial for further decisions on mitigation measures.
The application of societal risk to life criteria is to reflect the reality that society is less tolerant of events in which a large number of lives are lost in a single
event, than if the same number of lives is lost in a large number of separate events
(e.g. Alexander, 2000). Examples are public concern to the loss of large numbers of
lives in airline crashes, compared to the many more lives lost in road traffic or small
aircraft accidents (e.g. Alexander, 2002).
The use of cumulative F-N curves to reflect this is not universal. An example
which has been tried on an interim basis in Hong Kong to assist landslide risk
management of natural hillside hazards is shown in Figure 2 (GEO, 1998; Malone,
2005). The criteria depicted on Figure 2 were used to deem the tsunami risk level in
Thailand.
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Based on the return period estimates for tsunami scenarios, the recommended
design water levels, and the experience from the 26 December 2004 tsunami, the
annual risk to human life from a tsunami on the west coast of Thailand, and the
changes in this risk with time can be estimated. The Indian Ocean tsunami of 26
December 2004 caused very few casualties (none recorded in the available databases) in the coastal areas of Thailand where the inundation level was less than 3 m.
The main reason is that the coastal areas in west Thailand reach a level of 4-5 m
above mean level at a very short distance from the shoreline. Almost all the fatalities
in Thailand occurred in areas where the inundation level was more than 5 m above
the mean sea level. This is in contrast to the affected coastal regions in India and Sri
Lanka where the elevation of 3 m above sea level is reached several hundred meters
from the shoreline, and where many people died in areas where the inundation level
was about 3 m.
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Figure 2. Estimated risk of tsunami in Thailand plotted against the societal risk
tolerance criteria of GEO (1998) of Hong Kong. Zone A represents the
best estimate of the tsunami risk in Thailand today. Zone E represents the
situation prior to the tsunami of 26 December 2004 and also the long-term
situation after four to five hundred years if no risk mitigation is done.
Zones B, C and D are respectively representative of the situations after
50-100 years, 150-200 years, and 250-300 years if no risk mitigation is
done.
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Figure 3 Risk levels implied by the zones in Figure 2 simplified to risk in terms of
expected number of fatalities per year (averaged over several hundred
years) due to tsunami along the west coast of Thailand (ALARP: As Low
As Reasonably Practicable).
Figure 2 shows the estimated risk plotted on the societal risk acceptance criteria diagram for Hong Kong. Zone A represents the best estimate of the tsunami risk
in Thailand for the next 50 to 100 years. This risk is associated with the occurrence
of an M 8.5 earthquake at a critical location on the Sumatra-Andaman subduction
zone. Zone E, which clearly represents an unacceptable situation, represents the
situation prior to the tsunami of 26 December 2004 and also the long-term situation
after several hundred years if no risk mitigation is done. Figure 3 shows a simplified
version of the risk depicted on Figure 2 where the vertical axis represents risk in
terms of the expected annual human fatalities (averaged over several hundred years)
in Thailand to due a tsunami. The 10-5 and 10-3 bounds on the vertical axis of Figure
3, which respectively define the boundaries between acceptable vs. tolerable risk,
and tolerable vs. unacceptable risk, are based on the bounds defined by GEO on
Figure 2.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from Figures 2 and 3 is that, as far as
the tsunami risk in Thailand is concerned, the present day situation without risk mitigation measures is marginally acceptable and will remain so for one or two generations. However, a long-term strategy must be implemented to mitigate the tsunami
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risk by reducing the vulnerability and enhancing the coping potential of the exposed
population to an event similar to the one that occurred on 26 December 2004.
Conclusions
The main conclusions regarding future tsunami risk in Thailand are:
1. Within the next 50 to 100 years, the largest credible earthquake to be prepared for is a magnitude 8.5 event. The event could cause a tsunami which at
the most gives an inundation level of 1.5 to 2.0 m above sea level. If the
tsunami occurs at high tide, the inundation level could be 2.5 to 3.0 m above
the mean sea level.
2. After about 100 to 200 years, the potential for earthquakes greater than M 8.5
will increase gradually, and so does the potential for generating larger
tsunamis than that for the M 8.5 earthquake scenario. This implies that, as
time passes by, the tsunami risk will gradually increase from tolerable to
highly unacceptable.
3. Within the next 50 to 100 years, the potential risk from tsunamis to human
life and property in Thailand will be small and can be regarded as tolerable.
Therefore, in the short to medium term perspective, no mitigation measures
would strictly be required. However, already now steps should be taken to
reduce the more long term risk of human casualties
4. Despite the calculated low risk in the near future, it is purely a matter of time
until the next large tsunami event occurs. This time should be used to develop
a strategic plan to increase preparedness of the potentially affected society.
Preparedness measures include structural design codes and physical barriers,
but range also from land-use planning and early warning systems to education
of population and building monuments to remind the future generations of the
tsunami danger.
If no risk mitigation measures are planned and implemented in the reasonably near
future, it is likely that the long term tsunami risk will be forgotten within one or two
generations. No significant tsunamis are expected to occur within the next 50 years
or so, and the collective memory of the society in relation to natural hazards that
occur infrequently has repeatedly been proven to be short. It is therefore recommended that the authorities in Thailand already now plan for implementation of some
mitigation measures that can reduce the risk posed by severe tsunamis to future
generations. One cannot influence the earthquake and tsunami hazard, so the only
way to reduce the risk is to mitigate their consequences. The mitigation measures
that could/should be implemented in the short-term and long-term perspectives are
categorized and prioritized in NGI (2006).
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